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ABSTRACT
This essay examines three cases from the Supreme Court’s October 
Term 2013 addressing the standards for summary judgment. In one 
case, the Court affirmed summary judgment against a civil-rights 
plaintiff, in a continued erroneous over-reliance on the certainty of 
video evidence. In two other cases, the Court rejected the grant of 
summary judgment against civil-rights plaintiffs, arguably for the 
first time in quite a while. This essay unpacks the substance and 
procedure underlying all three decisions and considers the effect of 
the three cases and what signals they send to lower courts and 
litigants about the proper approach to summary judgment, 
particularly in civil-rights cases involving video evidence. 
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INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court’s 1986 trilogy,1 summary judgment
has been identified as the great cause of the decline of civil trials. 
 Professor of Law, FIU College of Law. This paper was presented in 
Procedural Hurdles and the Day in Court at the 2014 Southeastern Association of 
Law Schools Annual Conference; my thanks to all discussion group participants for 
comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Aaron Bruhl, Kevin Clermont, and John 
Parry for their reviews and comments.
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Although precise statistics about rates of summary judgment are
lacking,2 there is a general gestalt that summary judgment has 
accounted for a rising portion of motions and case dispositions.3
Many commentators complain that lower courts too readily grant 
summary judgment, particularly in favor of defendants and against
plaintiffs, and more particularly in civil-rights cases.4 Perhaps 
because the contours and standards of summary judgment’s broad 
reach were established so long ago, however, the Roberts Court has 
had little to add. Combined with the 2010 amendments to the 
summary judgment rules that largely bring the rule’s text in line with 
Supreme Court pronouncements and common practice,5 summary 
judgment seems settled and forgotten by the High Court.
By contrast, the Roberts Court has spent far more time on 
pleading standards and on increasing the role of Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissals in weeding out unfounded claims.6 And the vast array of 
empirical analyses of Twombly and Iqbal largely suggests that the 
Court has been successful in that endeavor.7
1. See generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 316 (1986); Anderson 
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 572 (1986).
2. John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United 
States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 568-69 (2012).
3. John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
522, 523 (2007); Langbein, supra note 2, at 569; Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush 
to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency 
Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 982, 984 (2003); Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing 
Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1330 (2005); 
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: 
The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 517, 548-49 (2010).
4. Bronsteen, supra note 3, at 539, 542; Schneider, supra note 3, at 548-
49. 
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; FED. R. CIV. P. 56 notes to 2010 Amendments.
6. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2471-73 (2014); 
Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2067 (2014); Lexmark Int’l v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1393-95 (2014); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
677-84 (2009); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322-23
(2007); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ind. State 
Dist. Council of Laborers & HOD Carriers Pension & Welfare Fund v. Omnicare, 
Inc., 719 F.3d 498, 508 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom Omnicare Inc. v. 
Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 134 S. Ct. 1490 (2014). But see
Johnson v. City of Shelby, ___ S. Ct. ___ (2014) (per curiam).
7. Compare Scott Dodson, A New Look: Dismissal Rates of Federal Civil
Claims, 96 JUDICATURE 127, 127, 132 (2012), Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An 
Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L.
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One possible (albeit unstudied) effect of this increased role for
12(b)(6) is a decreased role for summary judgment. It is increasingly 
difficult for plaintiffs to plead a “plausible” non-conclusory claim 
that can survive a motion to dismiss. And denial of dismissal on 
qualified immunity grounds in constitutional damages cases is 
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.8 As a 
result, summary judgment is less essential in disposing of non-trial-
worthy claims.9 Indeed, Iqbal’s express goal was to dismiss more
civil-rights actions before discovery, with its attendant cost, burden, 
and distraction on public officials.10 Given summary judgment’s 
reliance on discovery, exchange of information, and a full record of 
evidence to determine whether a case is trial-worthy,11 allowing 
fewer cases into discovery necessarily means fewer cases will be 
disposed of on summary judgment.
Prior to October Term 2013, the Roberts Court had decided 
only one case focused specifically on the standards for summary 
judgment—Scott v. Harris, an 8-1 decision from 2007, which is most
notable for according a unique, perhaps overwhelming role for video 
evidence on summary judgment.12 The Term thus was notable for the 
REV. 603, 603 (2012), and Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An 
Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED.
CTS. L. REV. 1, 7 (2012), with William H. J. Hubbard, Testing for Change in 
Procedural Standards, with Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 42 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 35, 35, 57 (2013).
8. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 672; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Pendent Appellate 
Bootstrapping, 16 GREEN BAG 199, 208 (2013) (discussing Iqbal’s expansion of 
immediate appeal under collateral order doctrine). 
9. See Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Plaintiphobia in the 
Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 193, 212 (2014) (discussing studies showing 
no change in summary judgment rates post-Iqbal, but arguing that “[i]f the parties 
have adjusted to the new pleading regime, then the cases remaining in the system 
will exhibit, at least after a while, the same attributes as the pre-Twiqbal caseload”); 
see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (insisting that the 
Federal Rules rely “on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to 
define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims”).
10. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685-86.
11. Langbein, supra note 2, at 567-68.
12. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-81 (2007); Howard M. Wasserman, 
Video Evidence and Summary Judgment: The Procedure of Scott v. Harris, 91 
JUDICATURE 180, 181 (2008). Summary judgment played an indirect role in Ortiz v. 
Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884, 889-90 (2011), where the Court held that a § 1983 defendant 
cannot appeal denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity after trial on the 
merits. The Court also decided two cases addressing substantive liability standards 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but with an express eye toward how 
those standards allowed for easier pre-trial disposition, particularly on summary 
judgment. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2532 (2013) 
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unexpected return of summary judgment standards to the docket and 
to the Court’s decision making. The Court resolved, in some manner 
and some procedural context, three cases squarely addressing
questions about the proper approach to summary judgment;
significantly, all were § 1983 actions involving Fourth Amendment 
claims of excessive force in which police-officer defendants asserted 
qualified immunity.13 The results were mixed and somewhat 
procedurally confounded. While one of the cases arguably produced 
the first summary judgment victory for a civil-rights plaintiff before 
the Supreme Court in quite some time, another largely reaffirmed 
Scott’s questionable approach to video evidence.
Courts and commentators continue to grapple with vanishing 
trials and increasing barriers to court access created by the “‘double-
whammy’” of heightened pleading under Iqbal and defendant-
friendly summary judgment.14 And the peculiar role of video 
evidence on summary judgment remains a salient issue,15 even more 
so in the wake of video-recorded clashes among media, protesters, 
and well-armed police in Ferguson, Missouri, and elsewhere 
throughout summer and fall 2014.16 It thus is worth examining all 
three decisions, and their particular contexts, in search of a better 
understanding of the present and future of summary judgment as a 
central tool of civil-rights litigation.
I. SCOTT LIVES
Scott v. Harris is most notable for according video evidence a 
special and uniquely powerful role on summary judgment. The Court 
insisted that video of a high-speed police chase (taken from the 
(insisting that a “lessened causation standard would make it far more difficult to 
dismiss dubious claims at the summary judgment stage”); Vance v. Ball State Univ., 
133 S. Ct. 2434, 2449 (2013) (arguing that supervisor status can be determined 
before or soon after litigation, or at least resolved on summary judgment); see also
Howard Wasserman, The Procedure of Title VII, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 24, 2013, 
2:21 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/06/the-procedure-of-
title-vii.html.
13. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014); Tolan v. Cotton, 134 
S. Ct. 1861 (2014) (per curiam); Thomas v. Nugent, 134 S. Ct. 2289 (2014) (mem.).
14. Schneider, supra note 3, at 550.
15. Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil 
Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 602-07 (2009).
16. Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, WASH. U. L.
REV. COMMENTARIES (Nov. 18, 2014), 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview_commentaries/26.
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pursuing squad car’s dashboard camera) “speak[s] for itself,”
conveying one obvious, neutral, unambiguous, and clear meaning 
that a court on summary judgment could determine for itself.17
Despite Justice Stevens’s insistence in dissent that the Court was 
improperly placing itself in the role of the jurors whose job it is to 
draw inferences from evidence,18 the Court treated the video as 
capable of only one rational understanding, meaning there was only 
one rational conclusion a fact finder could reach in the case. More 
problematically, the Court allowed judges to disregard testimony and 
other evidence “blatantly contradicted by the record”—that is, 
contradicted by the video and the singular message a judge on 
summary judgment gleans from it.19 Because video is so conclusive 
and certain, non-video evidence purporting to contradict it does not 
create factual disputes; it merely creates a “‘metaphysical doubt’” as
to the facts, long recognized as insufficient to avoid summary 
judgment.20
The one fully briefed and argued statement on summary 
judgment during October Term 2013 was Plumhoff v. Rickard,21 a 
case best seen as Scott, the Sequel. Like Scott, Plumhoff was an
excessive-force claim arising from a high-speed chase and police use 
of deadly force to end the chase.22 The chase began as a routine 
traffic stop and continued for some time on the interstate and city 
streets, with six police cruisers in pursuit.23 The chase entered a
parking lot, where officers and squad cars surrounded the fleeing 
vehicle; this paused, and perhaps ended (this was in some dispute),
the pursuit.24 When the driver did not get out of the car, but instead
continued maneuvering the vehicle, police fired fifteen shots into the 
car; the driver then drove out of the lot and back onto the street 
before crashing the car into a building.25 Both the driver and 
17. Scott, 550 U.S. at 378 n.5; Wasserman, supra note 15, at 624-25.
18. Scott, 550 U.S. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If two groups of judges 
can disagree so vehemently about the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances 
surrounding that pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a reasonable juror could 
disagree with this Court’s characterization of events.”); id. at 389-90 (referring to 
the Justices as jurors).
19. Id. at 380 (majority opinion).
20. Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 586 (1986)); see also Wasserman, supra note 15, at 622-26.
21. 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014).
22. Id. at 2017-18.
23. Id. at 2017.
24. Id. at 2017-18.
25. Id. 
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passenger, his daughter, died from a combination of gunshot wounds 
and injuries from the crash.26 As in Scott, the entire incident was 
captured on video from the dashcams of three pursuing police cars.27
The Court held in fairly short order (and without dissent) that 
the defendant officers were entitled to summary judgment. The 
officers did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights by firing 
fifteen shots at the car because (1) the chase was ongoing, meaning 
deadly force was justified to end it, and (2) having (properly) 
decided to use deadly force, the officers were entitled to use however 
much force was necessary to end the chase.28 In any event, the 
officers were entitled to qualified immunity because even if they 
used excessive force, it was not clearly established that such force 
violated the Fourth Amendment, given the absence of non-
distinguishable case law finding a violation in using deadly force in 
similar circumstances.29
Plumhoff is a troubling case from the standpoint of any desire 
to reign in summary judgment, particularly in video cases. But it 
could have been worse.
The bad of Plumhoff is, as in Scott, over-reliance on video at 
summary judgment. The Court described at length what “happened”
in the chase based solely on its review and interpretation of the 
video—it characterized the victim’s driving as “outrageously 
reckless”; spoke of cars on the road “forced to alter course” to avoid 
the cars involved in the pursuit; saw the trapped driver in the parking 
lot “obviously pushing down on the accelerator because the car’s
wheels were spinning” while his car’s bumper was flush against a 
police cruiser; and described the fleeing suspect as making “‘an 
attempt to escape.’”30 From this, the Court insisted that the “record 
conclusively disproves respondent’s claim that the chase in the 
present case was already over when [the officers] began shooting.”31
The Court consciously and explicitly grounded its analysis in 
Scott. While it did not insist that video can “speak for itself” and did 
26. Id. at 2018.
27. Estate of Allen v. City of W. Memphis, 509 F. App’x 388, 389 (6th Cir. 
2012).
28. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2021-22. Justice Breyer did not join the portion 
discussing the propriety of firing that many shots, and Justice Ginsburg did not join 
any part of the opinion finding no Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 2016.
29. Id. at 2024. 
30. Id. at 2021.
31. Id. at 2021-22.
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not include a URL link to the video in the opinion32—in fact, the 
Court never mentioned the video at all—it insisted that there was no 
reason to reach a different result.33 As in Scott, the Court drew 
conclusions and inferences about what the video showed. The
Justices understood the video as necessarily and unavoidably one-
sided, capable of only one meaning and telling only one
unquestionable and unambiguous story—the chase remained 
ongoing in the parking lot because the driver was still maneuvering 
his car, meaning he was trying to escape capture. Police thus did not 
act unreasonably in using deadly force at that point, because the 
video established that the chase, and thus the ongoing threat to public 
safety, was not at an end.34
The problems with this approach to video evidence on 
summary judgment have been described at length elsewhere. One is 
that video cannot, as Scott insisted and Plumhoff assumed, speak for 
itself. What video actually says depends on a number of different 
considerations—who and what is depicted, who created the images, 
and details of the images themselves (such as length, clarity, lighting, 
distance, angle, scope, steadiness, quality).35 These all affect the 
inferences that can and will be drawn from the video, allowing for
many different possible conclusions.36 But that uncertainty is 
precisely why summary judgment is inappropriate in a case such as 
this, which requires that a fact finder view the video and draw those 
inferences for itself.37
Second, as Dan Kahan and his co-authors famously showed,
what a viewer “sees”—and the inferences and conclusions a viewer
draws—from video are affected by cultural, demographic, social, 
political, and ideological characteristics.38 Video speaks “only 
against the background of preexisting understandings of social 
reality that invest[ed] those facts with meaning.”39 It thus becomes 
more essential that the broader range of community voices that 
32. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 n.5 (2007).
33. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2021.
34. Id. at 2021-22. 
35. Wasserman, supra note 15, at 620; Wasserman, supra note 16.
36. Wasserman, supra note 15, at 620.
37. Id. at 618-21; Wasserman, supra note 12, at 182-83.
38. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are 
You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 837, 879 (2009); see also Wasserman, supra note 15, at 627.
39. Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 38, at 883.
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comprise a jury be given an opportunity to review and draw 
inferences from the video. 
Unfortunately, Plumhoff demonstrates that the Court has not 
taken those lessons to heart. Nor have lower courts, which routinely 
grant summary judgment for defendants,40 and sometimes even for 
plaintiffs,41 solely on judicial conclusions about video. Plumhoff
validates and sanctions what courts have been doing, reaffirming this 
erroneous approach to video evidence and to summary judgment.
Indeed, Plumhoff goes one step further in that the Court never 
mentioned video as part of the record, even as it relied on it almost 
exclusively; we know there was video in the record only from the 
lower court opinion42 and because the attorneys referred to it during 
oral argument.43 Justice Alito simply recited the facts, described 
“what happened” during the chase and in the parking lot, and 
characterized the events, without identifying the video or any piece 
of evidence supporting those conclusions. The insistence that Scott
controls the result hints that this is a video case, but the Court hardly 
made that clear.
So why was Plumhoff not as bad as it might have been? Unlike 
Scott, the Court did not ignore testimony and other non-video record 
evidence in favor of the video. Since both the driver and passenger 
were killed, neither could offer testimony about the events that the 
Justices could then compare with their view of the video and 
disregard as contradicted.44 The only evidence was the video and the 
officers’ testimony (which was consistent with the video), thus the 
Court did not have the opportunity to favor some evidence over other 
40. See, e.g., Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 248-49 (6th Cir. 
2007); Mecham v. Frazier, 500 F.3d 1200, 1202 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007); White v. 
United States, 863 F. Supp. 2d 41, 49 (D.D.C. 2012) (describing “unbiased video 
evidence” as basis for court to reject plaintiffs’ version of events); Marion v. City of 
Corydon, Ind., No. 4:07-cv-0003-DFH-WGH, 2008 WL 763211, at *1 & n.1 (S.D. 
Ind. Mar. 20, 2008). But see Witt v. W. Va. State Police, Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272, 277 
(4th Cir. 2011) (finding video not sufficiently conclusive to override contrary 
testimony, where video was of poor quality, lacked sound, and had several seconds 
missing).
41. Hulstedt v. City of Scottsdale, 884 F. Supp. 2d 972, 982 (D. Ariz. 
2012).
42. Estate of Allen v. City of W. Memphis, 509 F. App’x 388, 389 (6th Cir. 
2012).
43. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 
2012 (2014) (No. 12-1117), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-
1117_f2ag.pdf (describing what the video “indisputably shows”).
44. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2018.
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evidence. While the power of a court to disregard evidence that is 
“blatantly contradicted by the record” was a repeated theme during 
Plumhoff arguments,45 it never came up in the opinion itself. The 
conflict here involved competing arguments about one piece of 
evidence—the video—and the reasonable inferences that could be 
drawn from it about whether the chase already had ended when 
police began shooting. Identifying only a single reasonable inference 
from the video is, normatively, the wrong approach to summary 
judgment. But it at least is preferable to a summary judgment court 
entirely ignoring some record evidence in favor of other record 
evidence and weighing and preferring video evidence over other 
available evidence.
Getting courts to understand and appropriately handle video 
evidence on summary judgment in civil-rights litigation is only going 
to become more important going forward.46 In August 2014, the town 
of Ferguson, Missouri, exploded over a fatal police shooting and 
massive and violent police response to subsequent public protests, 
much captured and replayed on video.47 At around the same time, 
video captured the apparent use of a chokehold by a New York City 
police officer resulting in an arrestee’s death.48 Other video-recorded 
police–citizen conflicts have been replayed across the Internet.49 At 
45. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 43, at 22.
46. Compare Gillis v. Pollard, 554 F. App’x. 502, 504 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(holding that there was no triable fact where the video contradicted the plaintiff’s 
testimony about having been struck in the groin), with Edwards v. Byrd, 750 F.3d 
728, 733 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating that the video was not as conclusive as in Scott,
justifying denial of summary judgment in favor of the defendant).
47. Wasserman, supra note 16.
48. Joseph Goldstein & Marc Santora, Staten Island Man Died from 
Chokehold During Arrest, Autopsy Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/nyregion/staten-island-man-died-from-
officers-chokehold-autopsy-finds.html?_r=0.
49. Daniel Politi, L.A. Police Caught on Video Shooting Homeless Man to 
Death, SLATE (Mar. 1, 2015, 11:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/
2015/03/01/video_shows_lapd_shooting_and_killing_homeless_man.html; Ed 
Mazza, Sean Groubert, South Carolina State Trooper, Fired & Arrested After 
Shooting Unarmed Man, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2014, 8:59 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/25/sean-groubert-fired-arrested_n_5879694
.html; Ben Mathis-Lilley, “I’m Not Your Brother,” Says Officer Tasering Black
Minnesota Man in Front of His Children, SLATE (Aug. 29, 2014, 9:42 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2014/08/29/minnesota_taser_video_christop
her_lollie_of_st_paul_tased_in_front_of_children.html; Howard Wasserman, 
Determining the Effect of Video, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 8, 2014, 9:31 AM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/07/determining-the-effect-of-
video.html.
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the same time, President Obama and a significant portion of the 
public now favor equipping police with body cameras.50
The result of these efforts will be an increasing amount of 
video evidence in an increasing amount of civil-rights litigation 
arising from police–citizen altercations. That, in turn, highlights the 
need for courts to pull back from the mistaken overreliance on video 
evidence reflected in the summary judgment analyses in Plumhoff
and Scott.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PROCEDURAL ODDITIES
A. Tolan and Thomas
In light of Plumhoff and Scott, and the overall trend on 
summary judgment (and pre-trial resolution generally), it becomes 
harder to know what to make of two other cases from late in the 
Term.
In Tolan v. Cotton, the Court, in a single order accompanied by 
a per curiam opinion, granted certiorari from the Fifth Circuit,
vacated a decision granting summary judgment for the police officer 
defendant, and remanded for further consideration.51 Prior to this 
decision, the Court had relisted the case for conference nine times.52
Tolan arose from a police stop gone bad and what can 
charitably be described as a combination of overzealous policing,
angry and offended homeowners, and negligent typing. A police 
officer saw a car pull in front of a house and ran the license plate;
unfortunately, he entered the wrong plate number (he mistyped one 
digit), and the computer reported a stolen vehicle of that make and 
model.53 He drew his weapon and ordered both Tolan (the driver) 
and his companion to lie on the ground on the front porch of the 
house, accusing them of having stolen the car.54 Tolan’s parents 
came outside and attempted to explain that they owned both the 
50. Wasserman, supra note 16; Howard M. Wasserman, Epilogue: Moral 
Panics and Body Cameras, WASH. U. L. REV. COMMENTARIES (Jan. 1, 2015), 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview_commentaries/27; see also 
INTERIM REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING,
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING (2015), available at 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/Interim_TF_Report.pdf.
51. 134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014) (per curiam).
52. Tolan v. Cotton, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/tolan-v-cotton/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
53. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1863.
54. Id.
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house and the car and that one of the men was their son.55 A second 
officer, Sergeant Jeffrey Cotton, arrived at the scene; the first officer 
explained that he had seen the two men exit a stolen car, while 
Tolan’s parents reiterated that there was no theft and they owned the 
property at issue.56 Cotton then ordered Tolan’s mother to stand by 
the garage door and physically moved her in that direction, although 
the amount of force is disputed.57 Seeing that, Tolan rose either to his 
knees or his feet (another disputed fact) and told the officer to 
“‘[G]et your fucking hands off my mom’” (his words are 
undisputed).58 At that point, Cotton pulled his weapon and shot Tolan 
three times in the chest.59 Tolan survived, although he suffered 
injuries that interrupted a promising baseball career.60
In the subsequent § 1983 action,61 the Fifth Circuit had 
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Tolan’s
constitutional claim, concluding that even if Cotton violated the 
Fourth Amendment in using deadly force, he was entitled to 
qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that an 
officer violates the Fourth Amendment in using deadly force given
the facts and circumstances at hand.62
But the Supreme Court rejected that conclusion. When 
deciding whether a right is clearly established for the second prong 
of the qualified immunity analysis, a court must define the right “on 
the basis of the ‘specific context of the case.’”63 It is not enough, for 
example, that a right against the use of unreasonable force is clearly 
established; the question is whether it is clearly established that this
right is violated by the use of particular force in particular 
circumstances in light of particular facts.64 In doing so, however, 
courts “must take care not to define a case’s ‘context’ in a manner 
that imports genuinely disputed factual propositions.”65
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1864.
57. Id. 
58. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Sergeant Cotton was acquitted on state charges of aggravated assault by 
a public servant. Id. at 1864 n.1 (citing Tolan v. Cotton, 713 F.3d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 
2013)).
62. Tolan, 713 F.3d at 301, 306, 308.
63. Tolan, 134 S. Ct at 1866 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 
(2001)).
64. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-41 (1987).
65. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866.
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The context in this case, according to the Fifth Circuit, was that 
(1) the area in which the encounter took place was “‘dimly-lit’”; (2) 
“Tolan’s mother ‘refus[ed] [repeated] orders to remain quiet and 
calm’”; (3) Tolan was “‘shouting’” and being “‘verbally 
threatening’” in telling Cotton to get his “‘fucking hands’” off 
Tolan’s mother; and (4) Tolan had risen to his feet and was moving 
towards Cotton.66 On those facts and in this context, it was not 
clearly established that Cotton was unreasonable in using deadly 
force.
But, the Supreme Court insisted, the Fifth Circuit defined the 
context only by impermissibly weighing evidence and failing to 
credit competing evidence.67 Instead, the Court specifically identified 
record evidence contradicting all four facts.68 Tolan and his parents 
testified that a gas porch lamp was more than decorative and did give 
off light and that there were floodlights and motion-activated lights 
in front of the house.69 Tolan’s mother testified that she was insistent, 
but neither agitated nor aggravated in speaking to Cotton.70 Tolan 
testified that he was not screaming. And although he did use an 
expletive, a reasonable juror could infer that those words reflected a 
plea rather than a threat, especially in light of further testimony that 
Cotton used significant force in moving Tolan’s mother and pushing 
her against the garage.71 Finally, Tolan testified that he was on his 
knees, not his feet, and “‘wasn’t going anywhere.’”72 This 
contradictory testimony created factual disputes, making it 
impossible to identify a specific factual context in defining the right 
at issue for qualified immunity purposes.
The Fifth Circuit erred in not properly crediting the plaintiffs’
contrary testimonial evidence. But reasoning that there might be 
other facts suggesting the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct
in that factual context, the Court remanded so the lower court could
credit this evidence and draw inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor, then 
decide anew whether Cotton violated clearly established rights.73
66. Id. at 1866-68 (first alteration in original) (quoting Tolan, 713 F.3d at 
305-08).
67. Id. at 1866.
68. Id. at 1866-67.
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 1867.
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 1867 (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 1868.
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Two weeks later, the Court issued an explicit summary Grant, 
Vacate, and Remand (GVR) order in Thomas v. Nugent, another 
Fifth Circuit decision, for reconsideration in light of Tolan.74 Thomas
also was a § 1983 action seeking damages for excessive force under 
the Fourth Amendment, with the defendant officer asserting qualified 
immunity.75 This case arose from the death of an arrestee who was 
tased eight times by an officer attempting to bring him into custody 
on an outstanding warrant; after several shots, the victim stood and 
wandered around the area, then dropped to the ground, crying for 
police to leave him alone so he could die.76 A similar scene later 
played when the victim got out of the car at the police station. The 
victim apparently died from complications of sickle cell anemia
triggered by use of the Taser.77
As in Tolan, the Fifth Circuit had held that the officer was 
entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity because it was 
not clearly established that the Fourth Amendment was violated on 
the facts and circumstances at hand.78 And as in Tolan, the court of 
appeals defined the specific context, allowing it to distinguish prior 
precedent that might have served to clearly establish the right.79
It is not clear from either the Fifth Circuit’s per curiam opinion 
or the Supreme Court’s GVR order what facts might have been in 
genuine dispute. The most likely problem was the lower court’s
conclusion that the decedent “attempted to evade arrest, was subdued 
only through the threat of deadly force, and did not comply with the
officers’ repeated requests to cooperate in effectuating the arrest.”80
With the context so defined, the use of the Taser did not involve the 
type of “obvious” violation that might be clearly established even 
without a body of case law.81 But the basic facts as recited earlier in 
the opinion at least potentially suggested not a threatening person 
resisting arrest, but someone suffering from significant physical and 
mental health problems. In fact, in denying summary judgment for 
the defendant on the excessive force claim, the district court had 
emphasized evidence that the decedent was “crying out for help,” as 
well as uncertainty about what the decedent was doing and whether 
74. Thomas v. Nugent, 134 S. Ct. 2289 (2014) (mem.).
75. Thomas v. Nugent, 539 F. App’x 456, 456 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
76. Id. at 456-57.
77. Id. at 458.
78. Id. at 459.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 461.
81. Id.
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he truly posed a threat to the officers when each subsequent Taser 
burst was administered.82
The Fifth Circuit also did not consider a different inference
favorable to the plaintiff—that his physical and mental problems and 
failure to comply, purportedly justifying subsequent Taser shots, 
might have been caused by the earlier shots themselves, particularly 
the third, which was at a higher intensity level. In other words, the 
officer’s initial uses of the Taser produced the very non-compliant 
behavior that purportedly justified the subsequent uses. Finally, 
potential disputes surrounded that single higher-intensity shot—both
whether the officer intended to do so (the Fifth Circuit concluded he 
did not, although it cited no record evidence) and whether that 
severity provided an alternative explanation for the decedent’s
subsequent continued non-compliance.
B. What Tolan and Thomas Portend
Ed Brunet and John Parry praise Tolan as the first time in many 
years that a civil-rights plaintiff prevailed before the Supreme Court 
on summary judgment.83 It thus is “tempting to [see it] as a major 
summary judgment decision” marking at least a slight move from a 
long-standing defense-centric approach to Rule 56.84 Indeed, the 
Court closed the opinion with a rousing paean to the benefits of trial 
and the limits of summary judgment:
The witnesses on both sides come to this case with their own perceptions, 
recollections, and even potential biases. It is in part for that reason that 
genuine disputes are generally resolved by juries in our adversarial 
system. By weighing the evidence and reaching factual inferences contrary 
to Tolan’s competent evidence, the court below neglected to adhere to the 
fundamental principle that at the summary judgment stage, reasonable 
inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.85
This is a strong statement, reminiscent of Justice Black’s criticism of 
“trial by affidavit and the sterile bareness of summary judgment.”86
82. Thomas v. City of Winnfield, No. 08-1167, 2012 WL 1255265, at *10 
(W.D. La. Apr. 13, 2012).
83. Ed Brunet & John Parry, Guest Post: Brunet and Parry on Tolan v. 
Cotton, CIV. PROC. & FED. CTS. BLOG (May 8, 2014), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2014/05/guest-post-brunet-and-parry-on-
tolan-v-cotton.html.
84. Id.
85. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1868 (2014) (per curiam).
86. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 176 (1970) (Black, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
Mixed Signals on Summary Judgment 1345
Brunet and Parry suggest Tolan might “embolden” lower courts 
to be more receptive to identifying factual disputes.87 There was no 
sense in Tolan that the testimony of Tolan or his parents ever could 
or should be ignored simply because it was “contradicted” by other 
evidence. Indeed, that seems to be the point—there was a genuine 
dispute of fact precisely because the officer and the plaintiff and his 
parents told conflicting stories. Nor did the Court suggest that a 
dispute over seemingly minor background inferences (for example, 
the amount of illumination from the gas porch lamp) was not 
material or that it created nothing more than “‘metaphysical doubt’”
about the facts.88 All of this is consistent with a normatively 
appropriate approach to summary judgment. But it is somewhat in 
conflict with Scott, where the Court did not hesitate to weigh video 
above all other evidence, and with Plumhoff (decided three weeks 
after Tolan), where video evidence was deemed sufficient on its own 
to warrant summary judgment with no consideration for the 
possibility of competing inferences from that video.
One important question is why the Supreme Court handled 
Tolan as it did and the effect of those procedural choices on the 
decision’s precedential force. The Court granted cert, vacated, and 
remanded in a single order with a per curiam opinion, based only on 
the cert. papers, without merits briefing, argument, or full
consideration.
The best explanation is that Tolan was a simple case involving 
established precedent and a circuit court opinion grounded in a “clear 
misapprehension of summary judgment standards in light of our 
precedents.”89 The case did not require discussion or elaboration of 
new legal principles, so plenary consideration was unnecessary. The
law already was clear that courts on summary judgment cannot 
resolve factual disputes when defining the specific context of a 
clearly established right for qualified immunity purposes; without 
establishing new law, the Court simply reminded lower courts of the 
proper existing standards and their obligations under those standards. 
The law also was clear that courts on summary judgment are not to 
weigh evidence or favor some testimony over other testimony. The 
subsequent Thomas GVR puts a fine point on this—the Court 
presumed that the Fifth Circuit had similarly “misapprehended” 
87. Brunet & Parry, supra note 83.
88. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).
89. Tolan, 134 S. Ct at 1868.
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established summary-judgment standards, so it remanded for the 
lower court to take another look, without even bothering to do it 
itself.90
The decisions together perform a signaling function, telling 
other circuits that they could be next, so proceed with caution. They 
reflect the Supreme Court supervising lower courts and pulling 
outliers back into line when they move too far afield.91 In addition, 
Judge Dennis sharply dissented from the Fifth Circuit denial of 
rehearing en banc in Tolan,92 an opinion that the Supreme Court’s 
per curiam closely tracked.93
But this explanation raises several concerns. First, it opens the 
door to the criticism in the separate opinion by Justice Alito, joined 
by Justice Scalia. Justice Alito argued that Tolan involved little more 
than routine consideration of the sufficiency of evidence in the 
summary judgment record and thus was not an appropriate case for 
even summary Supreme Court review.94
Second, this explanation dampens the force of this rare
summary judgment victory for a civil-rights plaintiff. The Court has 
suggested that per curiam summary dispositions are of more limited 
precedential force than cases resolved on the merits following full 
briefing and oral argument, at least for the Court itself.95 And while 
some per curiam opinions have become significant precedents, these 
90. Or, as one anonymous blog commentator put it, “‘So if the holding of 
Tolan is ‘remember the basic concept of summary judgment, dummy,’ then Thomas 
v Nugent seems to stand for the proposition ‘you probably did it again, dummy, but 
your work was so sloppy that we’re not even going to check it until you rewrite it.’” 
See Howard Wasserman, Two Procedural Cases of Note, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 20, 
2014, 9:31 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/05/two-
procedural-cases-of-note.html.
91. SUP. CT. R. 10(a); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, What 
Hath Raich Wrought? Five Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 915, 920 (2005) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s role in supervising lower courts on substantive 
law); see also, e.g., Hardy v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490, 495 (2011) (per curiam) 
(summarily granting cert. and reversing where the court of appeals failed to accord 
sufficient deference to the state court under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act).
92. Tolan v. Cotton, 538 F. App’x 374 (5th Cir. 2013) (Dennis, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
93. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1863.
94. Id. at 1868-69 (Alito, J., concurring).
95. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 24 
(1994); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 651 n.1 (1987); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 
U.S. 651, 671 (1974).
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were issued after full briefing, argument, and consideration.96 Future 
civil-rights plaintiffs facing a qualified immunity defense certainly 
can point to Tolan “nudging” lower courts to be cautious about 
finding facts or resolving conflicting evidence on summary 
judgment, especially in defining the factual context of a right on the 
“clearly established” prong of qualified immunity analysis. That the
Tolan Court took the time to identify the Fifth Circuit’s errors and 
the obvious factual and evidentiary disputes, rather than summarily 
vacating and remanding, might suggest a shift in the Court’s attitude 
towards summary judgment. But future plaintiffs lack that full-
throated statement that would have carried more persuasive force, 
especially given Tolan’s egregious facts.
Of course, this odd posture may have been necessary to 
produce a majority. Perhaps the nine relistings were a result of 
internal wrangling. Justices Alito and Scalia did not believe the case 
cert.-worthy, while insisting they were not dissenting from the grant 
of certiorari, which itself runs contrary to common Court practice.97
A per curiam opinion of more limited precedential force may have 
been the preferable option for the other Justices over outright denial 
of cert.
Third, even accepting that the procedural choices reflect 
necessary internal compromise, it is difficult to reconcile summary 
per curiam disposition in Tolan with the GVR in Thomas. A 
summary reversal corrects a “clear misapprehension” of controlling 
law,98 which the Court expressly identified as a basis for intervening 
Tolan.99 A GVR is appropriate where
intervening developments, or recent developments that we have reason to 
believe the court below did not fully consider, reveal a reasonable 
probability that the decision below rests upon a premise that the lower 
court would reject if given the opportunity for further consideration, and 
96. See generally, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444 (1969) (per curiam). For example, it is widely recognized that Justice Abe 
Fortas had drafted and circulated an opinion in his name in Brandenburg, but it had 
not been released when he resigned in May 1969. Justice William Brennan then took 
over the opinion, made some key language changes, and released it as a per curiam. 
SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 318 
(2010).
97. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1869 (Alito, J., concurring).
98. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 n.3 (2004) (per curiam).
99. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1868.
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where it appears that such a redetermination may determine the ultimate 
outcome of the litigation.100
That intervening development is most frequently a new decision 
from the Supreme Court.101 Summary reversals and GVRs are 
complementary ways for the Court to correct obvious lower-court 
error without the burdens of plenary review; the latter offers a
“cautious and deferential alternative” to the former,102 allowing the
lower court an opportunity to look for and correct its own error in 
light of intervening legal developments, rather than having the 
Supreme Court do it for them.103
While Thomas was an express GVR, Tolan is a bit harder to 
characterize. Although by its terms it did grant, vacate, and remand, 
it is not a typical GVR, which (as in Thomas) generally consists of a
“few boilerplate lines.”104 Tolan better fits with not-uncommon 
orders that formally vacate but for all practical purposes summarily 
reverse—the Court finds that the lower court applied the wrong 
standard, but rather than applying the correct standard itself, remands 
for the lower court to do it.105 By including the per curiam, however,
the Court appears to have done more—it applied the proper standard 
itself to show how the facts underlying the context of the case were 
disputed and how that undermined the grant of summary judgment. 
But it still remanded to give the lower court another chance to 
consider whether other facts nevertheless justified the original 
outcome.106
Tolan’s procedural posture also means the Thomas GVR
ordering reconsideration in light of Tolan makes no sense. If Tolan
was appropriate as summary reversal107 correcting a clear and 
obvious misapprehension of established precedent, it cannot function 
100. Lawrence ex rel. Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996) (per 
curiam); cf. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Supreme Court’s Controversial GVRs—
and an Alternative, 107 MICH. L. REV. 711, 712 (2009).
101. Bruhl, supra note 100, at 712.
102. Lawrence, 516 U.S. at 168.
103. Bruhl, supra note 100, at 712.
104. Id. at 717.
105. Id. at 717 & n.19; see also, e.g., Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 
454, 456 (2006) (per curiam).
106. Compare id., with Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 4, 7 (2013) (per 
curiam) (granting certiorari, reversing, and remanding in a Fourth Amendment 
excessive force case, where any right was not clearly established, regardless of 
whether a violation had occurred).
107. See Bruhl, supra note 100, at 717 (identifying similar cases with per 
curiam opinions as summary reversals rather than GVRs).
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as an intervening or recent development in the law that the Fifth 
Circuit panel in Thomas did not have an opportunity to consider. The 
Fifth Circuit in Thomas knew the existing summary judgment 
precedents and standards; nothing in Tolan purported to change those 
or to tell the lower court something it did not already know about the 
law of summary judgment. Tolan and Thomas thus stand on the same 
footing—in both, the Fifth Circuit was either right or wrong in its 
understanding and application of existing established summary 
judgment law. It follows that the cases should have been resolved in 
identical procedural fashion—either Thomas should have been 
summarily reversed with a per curiam, as in Tolan, or cert. should 
have been denied in both as simple cases involving the sufficiency of 
the evidence on summary judgment, as Justice Alito argued should 
have happened in Tolan.108
One perhaps could try to use the Thomas GVR to give Tolan
greater precedential heft. That is, if Tolan qualifies as an intervening 
development making the Thomas GVR appropriate (and no one 
recorded a dissent from the GVR), then Tolan becomes something 
more than an ordinary summary reversal—a fuller, even if per 
curiam, statement on the proper scope of, and approach to, summary 
judgment on qualified immunity in civil-rights actions.
III. GOING FORWARD ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The remaining question is the takeaway from all of the 
Supreme Court’s activity in October Term 2013, particularly the 
different attitudes towards summary judgment reflected in Plumhoff
on the one hand and Tolan and Thomas on the other.
An easy, albeit unfortunate, answer is that Plumhoff was a 
video case and Tolan was not. Perhaps adding video to the record in 
Tolan would have fundamentally changed the analysis and outcome. 
Had there been a dashboard camera or police body camera109 filming 
the events in front of the Tolan home, the Court might have watched 
the video and concluded for itself that (1) the porch and front of the 
house were “‘dimly-lit’”; (2) Tolan’s mother was loud and agitated 
and ignored repeated orders to calm down; (3) Tolan was 
108. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1868-69 (Alito, J., concurring).
109. See Wasserman, supra note 16; Wasserman, supra note 50; see also 
generally POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA 
PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED (2014), available at
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Technology/imple
menting%20a%20body-worn%20camera%20program.pdf;
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“‘shouting’” and being “‘verbally threatening’” in telling Cotton to 
get his “‘fucking hands’” off Tolan’s mother while Cotton used only 
minimal force against her; and (4) Tolan was moving towards
Cotton.110 And the contrary testimony of Tolan and his parents on 
each of those points could have been disregarded as “blatantly 
contradicted” by the inferences the Justices drew for themselves 
from watching the video. In other words, the Court might have used 
the video to make the same factual findings as the Fifth Circuit 
panel. Plumhoff, like Scott, reflects the irresistible urge to overvalue 
video on summary judgment. There is every reason to think the same 
tendency might have altered the outcome in Tolan.
A second possibility is that Plumhoff, as the sequel to Scott,
remains the analytical norm, while Tolan and Thomas are outliers. 
Certainly Plumhoff better fits with the disposition of one similar case 
from the Term involving pretrial disposition of a civil-rights action 
and qualified immunity.111 This explanation is enhanced to the extent 
the Court muted Tolan’s effect through procedural uncertainty. The 
Court’s decision granting summary judgment against a plaintiff 
received plenary consideration and a fully precedential opinion, 
while decisions rejecting summary judgment against a plaintiff 
received less thorough, less forceful, and more confounded 
treatment. Even granting the Tolan per curiam some value, the 
differences in precedential and persuasive force are unavoidable. 
Moreover, the long-term consequence of both Tolan and Thomas
depends not on the Supreme Court, but on what the lower courts do 
with the cases on remand.112
A third possibility is that none of these are about procedural 
standards on summary judgment, but instead are about underlying 
substantive considerations. Perhaps Tolan and Thomas are more 
significant as qualified immunity decisions. The real issue in both 
cases was how courts should define the factual context in 
determining whether a right is clearly established. Indeed, Judge 
Dennis specifically criticized the Fifth Circuit panel’s approach to 
qualified immunity and the way it erroneously conflated distinct 
110. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866-68 (quoting Tolan v. Cotton, 713 F.3d 299, 
305-08 (5th Cir. 2013)).
111. Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2014).
112. See Tolan v. Cotton, 573 F. App’x 330, 331 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding 
that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity 
grounds from the excessive force claim and remanding to the district court); Thomas 
v. Nugent, 574 F. App’x 445, 445 (5th Cir. 2014) (remanding to the district court for 
reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court decision in Tolan).
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prongs of the analysis—rather than analyze whether Sergeant Cotton 
was legally mistaken as to the force he was permitted to use (the 
appropriate inquiry in asking whether a right is clearly established), 
the court analyzed the facts on the ground and considered whether 
the use of force was justified on those facts.113 In rejecting the
panel’s approach and implicitly adopting that of Judge Dennis, the 
Supreme Court was guiding lower courts on qualified immunity—do 
not collapse the two prongs of immunity analysis, whether by 
importing potential factual disputes into the second step or by
conflating legal and factual considerations. Similarly, Plumhoff
might not be about summary judgment standards, but about 
substantive Fourth Amendment concerns for when police can use 
deadly force to stop an ongoing high-speed chase that threatens 
public safety and, having decided to use force, the amount of force 
that is appropriate to end that chase.
CONCLUSION
As of this writing, the Supreme Court had no cases on its 
October Term 2014 docket obviously presenting questions of the 
proper standards or scope of summary judgment. As the summary 
judgment trilogy approaches its thirtieth anniversary, perhaps those 
standards are locked-in. Aside from pulling an outlier circuit into 
line, as in Tolan and Thomas, the real focus will be on substantive 
law and the application of substantive law in that procedural context. 
Hopefully this focus will lead to a better understanding and reliance 
on summary judgment in civil-rights litigation, particularly in the 
ever-increasing number of civil-rights cases featuring video 
evidence.
113. Tolan v. Cotton, 538 F. App’x 374, 376 (5th Cir. 2013) (Dennis, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

